1957]

BOOK REVIEWS
CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS; Legal Relations Rising Out of
Contracts to Devise or Bequeath. By Bertel M. Sparks. New
York: New York University Press, 1956. Pp. 230. $5.00.
This book, despite its diminuitive size-two hundred pages of text,
probably one-third of it taken up with footnotes-is a comprehensive and
unified exposition of its subject. By reason of its clarity, completeness,
accurate analysis and cogent reasoning, it will take a place beside other
outstanding treatments of specialized segments of the law such as
Griswold's Spendthrift Trusts and Clarks' Real Covenants and Other Interests Which Run With Land as the definitive work in its field.
It is perhaps regrettable that the format, namely, law review style
without section division or section headings-the book is a collection of
law review articles by Professor Sparks-will tend to discourage use of
the book by the practicing attorney. There is, however, a good index.
The practicing attorney's initial impression that this is not for him may be
confirmed by the publisher's choice of only 10-point type, closely set.
The author adheres to one fundamental thesis: a contract to leave
property by will is no more and no less than a contract; its characteristics
and consequences derive from principles of contract law, not from the law
of wills. Self-evident as this would seem, students of the law of wills, even
if their acquaintance with contracts to make wills has not gone beyond that
familiar whipping boy of wills courses, Stone v. Hoskins,' and the dictum
2
of Lord Camden in Dufour v. Pereira,
upon which Stone v. Hoskins relies, know that courts have in fact confused contract ideas with wills ideas
to the point, at least, of supposing that a good bilateral contract to make
mutual wills is subject to rescission by one party to it provided he give the
other party notice; and that even such notice may be dispensed with, according to Stone v. Hoskins, if the other party appears not to be prejudiced
by the lack of notice. In numerous other instances, as the author demonstrates, some involving substantive rights and some having to do with the
type of relief available, error has resulted from failure to appreciate the
full import of the contract, or to apply contract principles consistently.
Certain examples may be noted.
(a) It has sometimes been held that if the promisee in whose favor
a will was to be made predeceases the promisor, the promisor is relieved
of his obligation and the executor of the promisee has no remedy on the
contract. (p. 93 n.70). This, the author points out (p. 93), overlooks
the fact that the promise was to transmit the property at the death of the
promisor and was not subject to a condition that the promisee survive the
promisor. The fact that under the law of wills a devise or legacy to a per1. [1905] P. 194.
2. 1 Dick. 419, 420-21, 21 Eng. Rep. 332, 333 (1769).
(1021)
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son who predeceases the testator, under ordinary circumstances, 3 fails by
lapse is immaterial. The testator in the present case has undertaken to see
to it that the promisee, and by implication, anyone who succeeds to the
rights of the promisee, gets the property.
(b) Although no court has been so foolish as to order a promisor to
make a will pursuant to a- contract, a court has enjoined a proihisor from
making any other sort of will (p. 96 n.81), and has enjoined a promisor
from revoking a will which complied with his contract. (p. 97 n.82). Such
injunctions are too easily set at naught by a mere secret writing of the
enjoined party; and in any event are of little advantage to the promiseeapart, the author concedes (p. 97), from such moral suasion as they may
exert-for the promisee's rights at the death of the promisor will not in
fact be impaired if the promisor has made or revoked a will in defiance of
the contract.
(c) An even more obvious error in remedy than the ones just mentioned has been made by a minority of courts in permitting a contract made
by the testator to be used, as a basis for contesting probate of a well-executed
will which does not comply with the contract. (p. 196 n.29).
The author gives us a clear, comprehensive statement (pp. 196-97)
of the proper modes of relief wherever the promisor has failed to comply
with his contract, either because he has made no will, or made a wrongful
will, or has made a will in defiance of a promise to die intestate; viz., an
action for damages against the personal representative of the deceased
promisor; or, if the contract concerned land or unique chattels, an action
in the nature of specific performance "in the same manner as if it had been
a contract to sell that had not been fully executed" (p. 197); and, no
matter what sort of property was involved, an action in the nature of
specific performance if the contract was for all or for a specified fraction of
an estate, since "the law court has no suitable machinery for the supervision of an estate accounting." (p. 197).
Probably any text, even if it deals exhaustively with a relatively
limited subject, will fail in the opinion of some reader to do full justice to
certain problems. As examples, in respect to the present work: (a) In the
discussion of the Statute of Frauds as a defense to a contract to devise or
bequeath, required to be in writing, one would have liked to have learned
the author's opinion of cases where, there being an oral contract to make
mutual wills, the surviving party has received the benefit of compliance
by the first party to die and then has altered his own will and died leaving
his property otherwise than as called for by the contract-in which cases
courts have sustained action brought by a third party beneficiary under
the contract and have held that the executor and the devisee or legatees of
the promisor, i.e., the second party to die, are estopped to set up the
Statute of Frauds.4 Obviously, this is not ordinary equitable estoppel.
3. But, as the author points out (p. 93), it is usually held that a devise or bequest
made in satisfaction of an obligation does not lapse.
4. Notten v. Mensing, 3 Cal. 2d 469, 45 P.2d 198 (1935).
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It goes even beyond the range of promissory estoppel. The case is, however, analogous to one where the testator leaves property to A on A's oral
contract to hold in trust for B. Although the Statute of Wills prevents
equity from enforcing the express trust, B, quite illogically, is allowed to
get the property from A by means of a constructive trust, the courts talking of "constructive fraud" as they also do in the mutual wills case. The
only defensible relief in both cases, it would seem, is restitution for the
benefit of the heirs or next of kin of the promisee. 5
(b) Where a person, when single, has made a contract to devise or
bequeath property, and thereafter marries, and is survived by his spouse,
the claims of the promisee under the contract may conflict with the protected rights of the spouse such as to dower or a forced share in the estate
of the promisor. The author's position as to the proper resolution of this
conflict is not in all respects clear. This reviewer understands him to say
that if the contract is merely for specified property, and not the entire
estate, the rights of the promisee are like a lien created for value before
the marriage, and therefore are superior to the claim of the surviving spouse.
(pp. 172-73, 199). But if the contract calls for leaving the entire estate
to the promisee, it is against public policy (as in restraint of marriage)
with regard to any property in which the surviving spouse has a protected
right such as dower or a forced share. (pp. 178, 199).
One reviewer of the present work, Professor Rheinstein, puts the case
of a contract to leave Blackacre and all the promisor's personalty to B and
then a marriage by the promisor to W. 6 Professor Rheinstein understands
the author to contend that W's dower interest in Blackacre should be subordinate to B's interest under the contract, and that W would be required to
pay to B the value of whatever indefeasible share in the personalty of the
deceased husband W takes by law. Query if this understanding on the part
of Professor Rheinstein is correct if, as his hypothetical case implies, the
contract was, in effect, to transmit the entire estate of the promisor at
death to B.

One other situation under this general topic troubles the present
reviewer. Suppose in a community property state like California the
promisor, having contracted to leave all his property to B, marries and
dies shortly thereafter, intestate, leaving only separate property. As to
such property the surviving spouse has no protected interest. The promisor
could have left it all by will to B. It is understood that Professor Sparks
would uphold B's right to the entire property, leaving the surviving spouse
empty-handed. On the other hand, Professor Sparks cites (p. 170), as if
it sustained his general position where a contract to devise an entire estate
is concerned, the leading case of Owens v. McNally,7 but fails to note that
the Owens case was precisely the situation above put and that in that case
5. See Scott, Conveyances Upon Trusts Not Properly Declared, 37 HARV. L. REv.

653, 670-88 (1924).
6. Rheinstein, Critique: Contracts To Make a Will, 30 N.Y.U.L.
1235 (1955).

7. 113 Cal. 444, 45 Pac. 710 (1896).

REv.

1224,
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the court held that the contract was against public policy not as to W's
protected interest in community property, for there was none, but as to her
unprotected interest as an heir with regard to the decedent's separate
property. The promisee was remitted to a restitutionary remedy, quantum
meruit, for services rendered under the contract.
So far as this reviewer knows, Professor Sparks is the first to emphasize the importance of wills contracts as estate planning devices available
in a considerable range of situations, not only with respect to family
arrangements, e.g., to provide care for an elderly testator, to protect a
child surrendered for adoption or custody, and to play a part in antenuptial and divorce settlements-but also in business connections, e.g., as
a device to maintain control of a corporation, to plan the disposition of
partnership assets, and to retain the services of a valuable employee.
(pp. 187-91, 200). It has been pointed out elsewhere 8 that lawyers would
have been interested in some further treatment of this matter, particularly
in respect to the tax consequences of the use of wills contracts. However,
Professor Sparks, a property man, may well have felt that tax questions
had best be left in other hands. The profession, in any event, is enormously
indebted to him for bringing illumination to a little discussed, and in some
ways confused, area of the law.
Lowell Turrentine t

REINHOLD NIEBUHR, HIS RELIGIOUS, SOCIAL, AND
POLITICAL THOUGHT. By Charles W. Kegley and Robert
W. Bretall, Editors. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956.
Pp. xiv, 486.
Reinhold Niebuhr is unique among theologians in the extent of his
influence beyond the company of those concerned with theology. In his
chair of "Applied Christianity" at Union Theological Seminary, his principal concern has been with the relation of biblical theology to problems of
social ethics.
The book being reviewed starts with an "Intellectual Autobiography"
by Niebuhr and ends with his "Reply" to the twenty "Essays of Interpretation and Criticism." Several of the essays raise questions as to
Niebuhr's hostility to the concept of natural law. This aspect of Niebuhr's
thought is the more striking because he rejects as well the reasoning of
typical enemies of natural law. He vigorously attacks the position that
ethical judgments are only expressions of personal preference and that
there are no objective criteria for criticism of legal institutions. Thus, he
rejects the ethical subjectivism and cultural relativism which underlie
modern positivist philosophies of law. Both his writings and his political
8. Rheinstein, supra note 6, at 1237.

t Professor of Law, Stanford University.
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activity testify to his conviction that criticism of law in terms of justice
is meaningful. But for all this, his attitude toward even the cautious
modem versions of natural law philosophy is one of "increasing rejection."
Niebuhr criticizes the natural law concept principally on two grounds.
He sees in it a pretentious rationalism which does not recognize that principles of justice are products of history perhaps more than of reason. But
even more important is Niebuhr's insistence that natural law reasoning
has typically been used in claiming a status of immutable principle for
dubious legal institutions of some particular historic culture. He cites
both Catholic writers who have absolutized institutions of mediaeval
society and Protestant writers who have invested with similar sanctity
nineteenth century ideas as to free enjoyment of property. In this recurring
phenomenon Niebuhr sees the operation of man's stubbornly sinful tendencies. As the essays in this volume indicate, the analysis of these human
tendencies is perhaps Niebuhr's greatest contribution, and some of his most
convincing illustrations have been drawn from man's pretensions in relation
to justice.
Examples of the misuse of natural law reasoning, however, do not
establish the unsoundness of the natural law approach-the attempt to
derive ethical and social criteria from inquiry into the nature of man.
While rejecting natural law terminology, Niebuhr does not in fact reject
this approach. Paul Ramsey, in the longest chapter in this volume, shows
how the affirmative elements in Niebuhr's ethical theory actually constitute a Christian doctrine of natural law.
In a sentence, that doctrine is that freedom is the essence of man's
nature and that love is the natural law for man. Man in his finiteness has
a power of self-transcendence, a dimension of freedom and self-criticism
which "points the self toward a more ultimate harmony." Man is made
for life-in-community and requires an object of devotion beyond himself,
an "indeterminate field of fellowship." Love is the ultimate law for man
because "'every realization of the self which is motivated by concern for
the self inevitably results in a narrower and more self-contained self than
(p. 84). Principles of justice are
the freedom of the self requires.'"
general formulations of what love requires under the conditions of civil
society made necessary by man's sin. Ramsey considers this the principal
theme of Niebuhr's ethical writings, most clearly stated in 1935 in An Interpretationof ChristianEthics, but also recurring in recent books. Niebuhr
thus places himself, according to Ramsey, within the great tradition of
natural law.
Other contributors to the present volume take Niebuhr's strictures
on natural law more at face value. Emil Brunner finds in Niebuhr's writings no adequate concept of justice (p. 30) ; and Robert E. Fitch considers
that the dominant note of Niebuhr's ethical analysis is one of "historical
relativism." (p. 306). In his Reply, Niebuhr is less concerned about
these somewhat unbalanced criticisms than he is about Ramsey's devoted
effort. He acknowledges that Brunner's "whole theological position" is
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close to his own, but notes a recent and rather wide divergence in ethical
theory "through his [Brunner's] increasing adoption, and my increasing
rejection, of the concept of 'Natural Law.'" (pp. 431-32). On the other
hand, Niebuhr agrees "perfectly" with Fitch that criticism of natural law
must be directed only against "too detailed and too inflexible 'rules' of
conduct." (p. 440).
The reply to Ramsey seems almost a comedy of errors. Niebuhr does
not hide his impatience with the elaborateness of Ramsey's defense. He
apparently misreads Ramsey as basically disagreeing with An Interpretation of Christian Ethics and hastens to "eliminate an area of difference"
by disclaiming any ability to defend positions taken in that book. This
seems to leave Ransey suspended in mid-air: where Ramsey finds Niebuhr
to have expressed a sound position with greatest clarity, Niebuhr insists
he was only dimly seeking his way-yet Niebuhr does not actually reject
the position which Ramsey takes such pains to attribute to him.
These aspects of Niebuhr's Reply leave one musing on the hazards
of theological polemic and on the limitations of "dialectical" modes of
expression. In any event one seems justified in concluding that Niebuhr
is not likely to extend the olive branch to natural law unless it changes
its name. Nor will he welcome efforts to mediate even from those who
have sat at his feet. This is unfortunate; for he thus gives an exaggerated
impression of his divergence from contemporary non-Roman theologians
like Casserley, political philosophers like Wild, and philosophers of law
like Fuller. These men warn as sharply as Niebuhr against trying to derive
fixed and detailed precepts from the natural law, but they regard natural
law terminology as appropriate for ethical theory which develops from
inquiry into the nature of man, and they look to such an approach for
ethical criteria relevant to the criticism of law.
Niebuhr does use his insight into man's sinful state in criticizing
political and legal institutions. As John C. Bennett expresses it, "Niebuhr's
theological teaching about human nature determines the limits of what
should be attempted in society." (p. 49). In his Gifford Lectures, Niebuhr
locates sin in the will-to-power with which man attempts to gain relief from
the anxiety inherent in his finite freedom. Niebuhr has come therefore to
reject Marxism because of its optimism as to human nature and because
he sees tyranny as the inevitable result of union of political and economic
power. His odyssey in regard to Marxism, Socialism and the New Deal
is traced in the essays of Bennett, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Kenneth
Thompson. Niebuhr recognizes also the ubiquity of greed and acquisitiveness, envy and sloth, and he has criticized British Socialists as sharing
"the Marxist illusion that there are limits to 'human . . . desires and

ambitions.'" (p. 74). He warns against "pretentious schemes to be imposed on society by 'abstract modes of social engineering,'" and places his
hope for justice in the equilibration of power. (pp. 76, 147).
With his understanding of human nature, Niebuhr presumably understands the hazards of economic adjustment through personal confrontation
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of power and also the hazards of trying to obtain equilibrium of power
through political action. Perhaps he would recognize that, for men as
they are, a system in which power is dispersed would be preferable-in
which economic adjustments come about through impersonal markets for
goods and services which do not rely upon the capacity of men for voluntary accommodation of conflicting interests. Perhaps Niebuhr believes
that apart from government action business men have almost unrestrained
power, that competitive market disciplines are practically non-existent,
Perhaps this is the only reason why he tends to brand defenders of freemarket enterprise as "doctrinaire individualists" or "decadent liberals."
On the other hand, perhaps a more explicit recognition of the value of
impersonal market mechanisms for adjustments among sinful men would
bring Niebuhr to re-examine his appraisal of the vitality of market disciplines and to weigh the possible advantages of protecting and maximizing
this vitality against the advantages he expects from trying to balance power
with power.
Wilber G. Katz t

JAMES WILSON, FOUNDING FATHER, 1742-1798. By Charles
Page Smith. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
Press. Published for the Institute of Early American History
and Culture. 1956. Pp. xii, 426. $7.50.
No man makes a swifter, a more utter passage into oblivion than the
deceased lawyer. Renown in the profession may have been his, but this
will barely survive him. Even the historic importance of the causes with
which he has been associated will not serve him as a passport into the gallery
of the posthumously famous. This is a matter which the biographers alone
are privileged to decide, and they have come to exercise their prerogative
only in favor of the lawyer who was translated to the bench or who achieved
political eminence. What induces such biographies is usually the sum of
what is told. For in the published lives of judges or of political personages
whose profession was their first bread, how much is ever related to their
practice, their skill as advocates or counsellors, their contributions at the
bar to the shaping of the law? Justinian's suum cuique is a precept laid
upon all men. It is one to which the biographer, in particular, should give
first obedience. To write a half-life is unpardonable.
James Wilson practiced law in Pennsylvania for more than two
decades. He was a leader in his profession when, in 1789, Washington
appointed him to the United States Supreme Court. Here he served nine
years. As a member of the Continental Congress he had participated in the
t Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
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framing of the Articles of Confederation. Subsequently he played an
important role at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. He delivered the
first law lectures at the Philadelphia college which merged with the University of Pennsylvania, and thus cut himself a niche in the history of
American legal education.
This was a life lived as a lawyer, and later as a judge, in a period no
less critical for the future of the law than for the political fortunes of the
states and of the nation. Only if written in these terms can a biography
of Wilson render him his due. This Mr. Smith has not done. He has,
instead, elected to tell his tale in terms of the political events and thought
of the times. The morsels of fact about Wilson's professional activities
before his elevation to the bench, even, indeed, of his work as a judge, are
dispensed with a sparing hand. The effect is episodic, and is not mitigated
by the fact that the items were chosen in contemplation of their relevance
to the sort of story Mr. Smith has chosen to tell. A first example is the
account of Wilson's apprenticeship in John Dickenson's law office.
Manuscript material has been preserved in sufficient amount to reconstruct an informative picture of what the course of study in a late
colonial Philadelphia law office involved. Mr. Smith, however, seems concerned only in what these sources reveal with respect to a grounding in
political ideas. It is interesting, of course, to learn that young Wilson
conned the fashionable philosophers. He must, however, have done something more substantial to satisfy his preceptor. The study books listed
by Mr. Smith include the names of twelve philosophers as against but four
who wrote on the common law. He mentions no law reports unless the
cryptic reference to "Hardwicke" can be taken to refer to Cases temp.
Hardwicke. On this showing Wilson would have come to bar with a defective foundation in the law. In view of his record this seems improbable.
We should not be left to wonder how he equipped himself for a profession
in which he was to make his mark.
Wilson began his career at the bar as a country lawyer. What the
nature and range of his practice was we are not told. Mr. Smith states in
his notes that he examined the judicial records of Berks, Cumberland and
other counties. Yet beyond statistics on the number of the cases in which
Wilson appeared as counsel at certain terms of various courts of common
pleas no exact details are vouchsafed. The compilation of such details
from manuscript records is dull business, as this reviewer can testify. It
seems not unreasonable, however, to expect that in a biography of one who
was one of the first appointees to the United States Supreme Court, searching inquiry would be made into the subject's work at the bar for the light
it might throw upon his professional competence. Unlike some of the
colonies where practice in local courts was small beer, indeed, Pennsylvania
had made its courts of common pleas the chief locus of original jurisdiction
in civil causes. Here Wilson seems to have conducted the major part of his
practice. He had also been admitted to the provincial Supreme Court in
1769 and Mr. Smith intimates that he travelled the circuit. The oppor-
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tunities to develop a high degree of professional skill were obviously present.
The question remains what Wilson made of them.
In 1778 Wilson moved to Philadelphia. Mr. Smith assures us at the
end of his chapter, "A Philadelphia Lawyer," that Wilson had "one of the
largest and most successful practices in America." There is precious little
offered in support of this assertion. Except for the pair of treason cases
of Carlisle 1 and Roberts,2 and an account of Wilson's employment by
Benedict Arnold to argue Olmstead's claim in the appeal of the sloop
"Active," no samplings of this practice are mentioned. Two executed
traitors and one who barely escaped the noose seem hardly the type of
clients to promote a volume of retainers.
It happens, however, that in the first two volumes of Dallas' Reports
is discreted some further evidence on Wilson's practice. Mr. Smith indicates in his notes that he consulted both volumes and it is remarkable that
he should have overlooked the numerous cases where Wilson appeared as
counsel and where the arguments are summarized. On many occasions
Wilson had co-counsel and here the task of fixing what his own contributions may have been presents a problem. Dallas states in the preface to
his first volume that he had access to the briefs of counsel, and it would
seem to have been an obvious move to discover if any of these are still
extant, and, if so, to examine them. There is no indication that this was
done. These cases in Dallas played a role in the development of Pennsylvania's law, as a glance at Mr. Shephard's admirable Citator will reveal.
Surely Wilson's part in Pollard v. Shaffer 3 wherein McKean, C.J., was
led to remark on the status of equity in Chanceryless Pennsylvania, to the
discomfit of Wilson's client, is at least as deserving of examination as his
views on the law of treason. But Mr. Smith was impelled to the strange
choice of Carlisleand Roberts as a prelude to an attempt to father on Wilson
the treason provision of the United States Constitution. He fixed on
Olmstead's claim because he is persuaded that the case of the sloop "Active"
is "one of the most famous cases in American legal history"--an opinion
this reviewer does not share.
Of Wilson the judge Mr. Smith has a little more to say than of Wilson
the lawyer. Nevertheless, even for a reader conversant with the early
history of the federal judiciary it will be difficult to evaluate Wilson's contributions on the basis of what is presented in this book. This is due chiefly
to the fact that Wilson's judicial opinions are noticed in the course of a
general narrative of events in his personal life, in particular his business
speculations during this important period. Furthermore, the examination
of Wilson's work in the circuit courts is woefully incomplete. It is, perhaps, excusable that contemporary newspapers, which Francis Wharton
and after him Charles Warren found useful sources, were not searched. It
is not easy to understand, however, why Wilson's published opinions were
1. Respublica v. Carlisle, 1 Dall. 35 (Pa. 1778).
2. Respublica v. Roberts, 1 DalU. 39 (Pa. 1778).
3. 1 Dall. 210 (Pa. 1787).
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not fully considered and why clues in the reports respecting his activities
in the circuit courts were not pursued. The Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred upon these courts a large original jurisdiction. Mr. Smith, however, has given only two samples of Wilson's work as trial judge-United
States v. Ravara4 and United States v. Henfield.6 These are examined
without reference to the issue then boiling up, whether or not there was a
federal common law-a matter on which Wilson had decided opinions. As
for the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit courts, Mr. Smith mentions only
Wilson's circuit opinion in Hylton v. United States." The fact that certain
causes came to be finally adjudicated in the Supreme Court is no excuse
for ignoring intermediate appellate opinions, especially in a biography of
the man who delivered them. Indeed, his views cannot be otherwise understood, because when opinions were delivered seriatim in the Supreme
Court the Justice who had spoken at circuit abstained from expressin 3
his own conclusions in the higher court. It would be no less enlightening
to have the circuit opinion in the instances where the Supreme Court's
decision was per curiam.
Admittedly, some of Wilson's circuit opinions are not of a character
to entice a lay historian. But this cannot be said of the cases precipitated
by the enforcement of Washington's neutrality policy. For example,
Wilson had the Middle Circuit when Glass v. The Sloop Betsey 7 came
up from the district court. While on the Southern Circuit in 1794, he
appears to have given an opinion in Strannock v. The Friendship8 and also
in Talbot v. Jansen,, a case out of which a prosecution for piracy resulted
that Wilson tried. No search for these opinions or others unpublished
appears to have been made. So few were the years that Wilson sat on
the bench, so small the volume of judicial business which came before him
that no effort should have been spared to settle how well he adorned his
office.
If these criticisms seem to go primarily to questions of judgment
in the choice and handling of legal materials, they nevertheless raise inferentially the question of competence. A scholar's critical apparatus is the
place where a reviewer looks to resolve his doubts. This book, unfortunately, is so meagerly footnoted that one is led inevitably to wonder how
exacting was the search and collation of judicial records as well as of the
extant Wilson papers. This could not, it is believed, be done effectively
without some working knowledge of eighteenth century English law, particularly in its colonial and post-Revolutionary manifestations. Mr. Smith's
qualifications in this particular are revealed in the course of discussing
Wilson's first law lectures at the College of Philadelphia.
4. 2 Dall. 297 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) ; see WHARToN, STATE TaIALS OF

THE
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STATES 90 (1849).

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 49.
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794).
4 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDIcATIONS 150-51 (modem series 1931).

3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795).
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Mr. Smith believes that, in America, a legal revolution began "in the
early seventeenth century and ended, for all practical purposes, in 1789."
(p. 318). He starts with the Puritans who "were emphatic in their
rejection of English law and their substitution of Biblical law." (p. 316).
The experiment failed but
". .. the attitude of opposition to English law which the Puritans carried with them prevailed as the dominant pattern throughout
the colonies...
"Colonial America was, for the most part, anti-legal or a-legal
well into the eighteenth century. Lawyers were looked down on and
even legislated against. They had less status than honest artisans,
and indeed constituted in colonial eyes a pariah caste." (p. 317).
It seems strange in this day and age to come upon an uncritical acceptance of the undocumentable thesis of the utter supremacy of the Bible
in colonial law. What is no less curious is that there should be a new
subscriber to the doctrine, so long cherished in certain quarters, that the
early history of the Bay Colony holds the explanation of everything that
took place in less God-fearing provinces. Our acquaintance with a variety
of colony records indicates that the sources of many colonial rules and
practices are to be found in English local law and custom. As ignorance
yielded to learning, the rude imitation of models, themselves of a provincial
cast, was succeeded by an inexorable movement toward an ever increasing
absorption of common law. Furthermore, if one is justified in supposing
that litigiousness is the very contrary of an "anti-legal" or "a-legal" disposition, the scores of minute books of colonial local and superior courts
are conclusive on a passion for going to law not of a flight from it. As for
the lawyers, the pristine seventeenth-century prejudice may be laid as much
to the half- or un-educated men who were first to practice in this land
as to the bias of settlers who had had unhappy brushes with the law at
home. Surely, Mr. Smith does not believe that early eighteenth-century
lawyers like James Emott in New York, Andrew Hamilton in Pennsylvania, the elder Daniel Dulany in Maryland or John Randolph in Virginia,
and their fellows were viewed as so many social outcasts?
Mr. Smith next advances the view that the increasing complexity of
colonial society "forced the gradual acceptance of common law, and by the
middle of the eighteenth century, colonial America was ready for a great
legal renaissance." (p. 317). It is his opinion that "where the legal
revival in England expressed itself in excessive formalism, colonial law,
while by no means unaffected by this English trend, was forced into broader
and more democratic channels." (p. 317).
Lawyers who have occupied themselves with the problem of the
transplantation of law to America are cognizant of how little the growing
complexity of society had to do with the process of imitating or adapting
common-law rules and practices. Some of this reception was the result of
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local administrative action as, e.g., in New York, where primogeniture and
entail came in under Dorgan (1683-88). But for the most part it was the
tightening of imperial controls, which began under Charles II, and the
immigration of lawyers that hastened the process. By 1750 this process of
absorption and accommodation was far advanced in many of the provinces,
and the power of this movement was nbt spent until long after independence.
As long as the Crown exercised its power of review, there was little or
nothing provincial legislatures could do to cut "broader and more democratic channels." The proposition remains to be proven that the conduct
of litigation cut such channels when everything, English law-books, legal
education and the appellate structure, conspired to assure that practice
should be molded in the image of English prototypes. If Mr. Smith found
support for his proposition in the Pennsylvania manuscript records consulted by him, he should have proffered it, particularly as the colonial cases
in Dallas read otherwise. The effect of this naked assertion upon the
reviewer was merely to heighten a suspicion that the author is not sufficiently conversant with the law of the times to do justice to his subject.
The comments on the shortcomings of this book have been confined
to the treatment of only one aspect of Wilson's active and varied career,
for it is this phase of the book that the writer believes he is most competent
to judge. Much could be said, however, about the handling of Wilson's
personal life and political activities. The whole is smothered with so much
undocumented, indeed palpably fanciful detail-it is dotted with so many
"perhapses," "probablies" and "no doubts," that this reviewer at least had
the sensation of fishing through a superfluity of sauce for an occasional scrap
of meat. It may be a mere matter of taste to prefer the gaunt text of the
Journal of the Continental Congress to a version with such interpolations
as "Wilson was heard with respectful attention" (p. 83) ; or to find it easier
to follow Madison's Notes on the Constitutional Convention without such
(p. 226). Emglosses as Dickenson's "face flushed with annoyance."
broidery of this sort is not necessarily harmless, for it has often, as in the
instances cited, a tendentious quality, and when it has should be clearly
labelled as author's conjecture. A desire to make history interesting is
praiseworthy, but it should not be indulged to the point of shaking the
reader's confidence in'a writer's candor in what he presents as facts.
Julius Goebel, Jr.t
t Professor of Legal History, Columbia University School of Law.

